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USING THE 1911 AUSTIN DAM FAILURE CASE HISTORY IN UNDERGRADUATE
TEACHING
Andrew T. Rose, Ph.D., P.E.
University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown
Johnstown, PA 15905

ABSTRACT
The 1911 sliding failure of Austin Dam in Potter County, Pennsylvania presents an interesting case history combining an engineering
failure with ethical, social legal and regulatory issues. The concrete gravity dam, completed in December 1909, was plagued by poor
design and construction, influenced greatly by the owner pressuring the designer to keep costs low. Seepage through the foundation,
an inadequate shear key, and cracking of the cyclopean concrete, all contributed to the eventual catastrophic failure that destroyed the
towns of Austin and Costello, claiming at least 78 lives. As a case history, the failure of Austin Dam has applicability to a number of
ABET program outcomes. The obvious sliding failure of the dam due to uplift pressures and weakened foundation rock directly
addresses certain technical program outcomes. The economic aspects of the dam’s design and construction, the social issues involving
relief efforts, the contemporary national media coverage, as well as the ethical and legal aspects of the dam’s failure address other
program outcomes. Various aspect of the failure of Austin Dam have been documented in several recent papers, providing a
comprehensive geotechnical case history that can be appropriately incorporated into the undergraduate civil engineering curriculum

INTRODUCTION
The sliding failure of a concrete gravity dam just north of the
town of Austin, Pennsylvania on September 30, 1911, as
shown in Figure 1, presents a strikingly visual case history for
undergraduate students of civil engineering. Located on
Freeman Run, the town was home to the Bayless Paper Mill.
Established in 1900 by George C. Bayless of Binhampton,
NY, the company had constructed a small dam further
upstream on Freeman Run. By 1909, the existing reservoir
was deemed inadequate and the company constructed a new
concrete gravity dam. The new dam was 540 feet long and 45
ft high. During filling of the reservoir in 1910, the dam
experienced noticeable movement downstream. The reservoir
was temporarily drained and the spillway was enlarged. The
reservoir was again filled and on September 30, 1911 the dam
failed suddenly as the concrete dam slid downstream on its
foundation and broke apart into large concrete masses. The
flood waters destroyed the towns of Austin (pop. 3,200) and
Costello (pop. approx. 400-500) and claimed at least 78 lives.

shown in Figure 2. Located near the headwaters of the
Allegheny, Genesee, and Susquehanna Rivers, Freeman Run
flows from the north through Austin and then the south and
east reaching the west branch of the Susquehanna via the
Sinnamahoning River (Martt et al 2005).

BACKGROUND
The Austin Dam failure occurred in north central
Pennsylvania, about 25 miles south of the NY boarder, as
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Figure 1. The strikingly visual remnants of Austin Dam as of
2007. (Andrew T. Rose).
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easily adaptable for inclusion in the curriculum. Most of the
recent papers offer an overview of the failure, while delving
into various aspect of the case in more detail.
A brief
summary of several of the topics that can be addressed by this
case history and the articles that students can use to learn more
are presented in Table 1.
Location of
Austin, PA
Pittsburgh
Philadelphia

Figure 2.
Location of Austin Dam in north-central
Pennsylvania. (modified from apples4theteacher.com)
The early industries of Austin focused on lumbering in the
nearby hills. As the hardwood resources were depleted, the
industries evolved into producing pulp for paper making use
of the waste and new growth in the Bayless paper mill [Rich
2006]. The water-intensive process required a steady water
supply. When the first dam constructed proved inadequate
during drier summer months, Bayless hired engineer T.
Chalkley Hatton of Wilmington, Delaware in early 1909 to
design a new dam across Freeman Run. The new 540 ft long,
45 ft high concrete dam was completed in December 1909, as
shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Photograph of Austin Dam near end of construction,
prior to filling. (Austin Dam Memorial Association)

ASPECTS OF CASE HISTORY
The Austin Dam failure case history presents several aspects
that can be researched by students or used in class discussion.
The amount of literature on this case history, both recent
investigations and discussions, as well as contemporary
articles and newspaper accounts of the failure, make this case
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Table 1. Summary of Austin Dam case history topics and
reference reading
Selected Reference Reading1
Holmes [1994]
Downs [1998]
Wise [2005]
Delatte [2009]
Heimel [2011]
Design and Construction
Rich [2006]
Engineering News [1911]
Geotechnical Analysis of
Martt et al. [2005]
Failure
USBR [1998]
Designing Dams for Uplift
Jackson [2003]
Harrison [1912]
Geology of site
Martt et al. [2005]
Greene [1997]
Greene and Christ [1998]
Quality of Concrete
Delatte [2009]
Martt et al. [2005]
Social Responsibility
Rich [2006]
Taylor [1911]
Ethical Responsibility
Hatton [1912]
Rich [2006]
Vesiland [2010]
Relief Efforts
Nuschke [1988]
Dixon [1912]
Taylor [1911]
Largey [1999]
Heimel [2011]
Legislation and Regulation
Scientific American [1911]
Rich [2006]
Water Supply Commission of
Pennsylvania [1913]
Contemporary Accounts
Largey [2011]
Engineering News [1911]
1
For complete reference, see REFERENCES at end of paper
Topic
General Overview of Failure

INCORPORATION OF CASE IN TEACHING
The Austin Dam failure can be incorporated into an
introductory undergraduate geotechnical engineering course.
One possibility when working in a small class, or perhaps in a
small laboratory class setting, would be to have three or four
student teams research various aspects of the failure and its
consequences and prepare presentations for the class or
laboratory section. Another possibility is to have students
read reference papers addressing one or two aspects of the
case and then have a class discussion of the case. Students
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would be expected to contribute and participate in the
discussion based on the knowledge gained from their assigned
reference. Another possibility is for the instructor to prepare
and present a comprehensive overview of the case to the class,
addressing the various aspect of the failure.
Whichever method is used to incorporate the Austin Dam
failure, a number of notable aspects should be identified and
discussed.
The sections that follow, present concise
summaries of these aspects with appropriate references.

FLAWS IN DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
According to Engineering News [1911], dam construction
began in May 1909 and was completed about December 1,
1909. The contractor was C.J. Britnall & Co. of Binghamton,
NY. The construction involved 7,925 cu. yds. of foundation
excavation, 6,360 cu. yds. of embankment, and 15,780 cu. yds.
of concrete. The total cost was $71,821.48, not including
engineering. Figure 4 shows the dam under construction.

further, Bayless asked for the gate house and valves to be
eliminated and instead a single pipe through the dam serve
both purposes. With some hesitation, Hatton apparently
relented and agreed to the change but requested a Y at the
lower end splitting the pipe and providing two vales as a way
to drain the reservoir, if needed. Bayless responded that he
did not see the need for the valve on the outlet pipe and
instead indicated it would just be capped for the present time
and that would be sufficient.
Further along in the construction, Rich [2006] documents
another series of correspondence where Hatton discovers that
Bayless has directed the construction crew to raise the height
of the dam and spillway by 2 ft, without consulting Hatton.
Hatton protests and provided a sketch indicating that the
stability of the structure will be affected and that changes such
as this cannot be made without consulting him. Bayless
countered that Hatton’s assistant onsite was made aware of the
changes.
According to Delatte [2009] the dam was constructed of
cyclopean concrete, with large rock inclusions in the matrix.
In addition, some of the work was performed under cold
weather conditions with concrete being placed under freezing
conditions. Horizontal and vertical construction joints were
present in the structure and it is not certain of the efforts taken
to keep these joints from forming planes of weakness seepage
paths.within the structure. Although a minimal amount of
twisted rods were used to anchor the dam to rock and in the
thinner upper portion of the dam near the crest, no record
exists of rods being used across cold joints in the concrete
structure. Figure 5 shows the cyclopean nature of the concrete
in a remnant of the dam. Figure 6 shows a portion of the dam
after years of weathering with vertical and horizontal joints
apparent. Figure 7 shows one of the rods used to anchor the
dam to the underlying rock.

Figure 4. Construction of Austin Dam (Courtesy of Potter
County Historical Society)
Rich [2006] identified several flaws in the dam’s design and
construction, largely by researching the correspondence
between the owner, George C. Bayless, and T. Chalkley
Hatton the Engineer. In reviewing the correspondence, Rich
[2006] saw repeated instances of the owner trying to cut costs
to such an extent that the failure of the dam was inevitable.
While Hatton stressed in his correspondence with Bayless his
desire to design a dam that was safe, he also gave in to
Bayless on several requests to reduce costs.
These
compromises combined with poor construction and bad
foundation conditions ultimately resulted in the failure. in
multiple situations. In his design Hatton called for a cut-off
wall sufficiently deep into the underlying rock, anticipated to
be 11 feet. Bayless pushed Hatton to reduce the depth of the
cut-off wall so that the final depth was only 4 ft into the
underlying rock. Another design aspect called for a gate
house with appropriate vales for cleaning the filter screens and
fo providing the water supply to the mill. To reduce costs
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Figure 5. Dam remains showing cyclopean concrete. (Andrew
T. Rose)
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Figure 6. Spillway section of dam showing vertical and
horizontal joints after years of weathering. (Andrew T. Rose)

Figure 8. Buldgeing of dam crest east of spillway observed in
January 2010 (Courtesy of Potter County Historical Society).

Figure 9. Seepage on downstream face of dam in January
2010 (Courtesy of Potter County Historical Society).
Figure 7. Rod used in construction of dam. (Andrew T. Rose)

WARNING OF PROBLEMS
After the dam was completed and put into service, a problem
occurred which should have foretold of potential failure.
After snowmelt and heavy rains in January 1910, the dam was
subject to a full reservoir and a portion of the dam east of the
spillway slid downstream about 31 inches at the crest [Greene
1997], as shown in Figure 8.
The movement was
accompanied by the observation of vertical cracks on the
downstream face, seepage in the channel 10 to 12 ft below the
toe [Engineering News 1911]. The photograph shown in
Figure 9 indicates that with water going over the spillway, the
newly completed dam had seepage at several locations on the
downstream face, possibly originating from construction joints
in the concrete structure.
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This initial movement of the dam by sliding caused concern
and the effort to relieve pressure behind the dam was
hampered by the lack of a relief valve, which had been
eliminated from the design by Hatton, as directed by Bayless
to save money. In additon, the cap on the outlet pipe was at
the foot of the spillway and inaccessible due to the heavy
flow, thus removing the cap was not possible [Engineering
News 1911]. Instead the Bayless company undertook a
somewhat foolish measure and using dynamite, blasted out a
small section of the crest about 6 to 8 ft wide and 4 ft below
the crest. This lowered the head of water behind the dam to
about 37 ft, as shown in Figure 10. Even with the lowering of
the water level, concern remained, so a second charge was
used to blow off the cap on the outlet pipe and the reservoir
was drained [Engineering News 1911]. At that time it was
observed that part of the embankment on the upstream face
had eroded away through the outlet pipe and possibly under
the dam. It was further observed that a section of the dam had
moved downstream relative to the inlet chamber wall through
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which the outlet pipe passed [Engineering News 1911].

The dam appears to have functioned adequately until the final
and complete failure on September 30, 1911. The dam
essentially broke into pieces as the water pressure from the
reservoir behind the dam pushed the massive concrete blocks
downstream. Figure 12 shows a view of the dam blocks
strewn across the valley. A somewhat fortunate occurance
was that a nearby resident saw the dam as it burst and
telephoned dowstream to the town of Austin, giving some
time to escape the flood waters. Records indicate at least 78
people died as a result of the flood. Most of the casulties were
in Austin which was about 1 ½ miles below the dam, but there
were also casulties further downstream in the smaller
community of Costello. Figure 13 shows some of the
destruction caused by the flood.

Figure 10. Concrete removed by dynamite to relieve pressure
behind dam, January 1910 (Austin Dam Memorial
Association).
Comparing Figures 8 and 10, the hole blasted in the crest was
locanted near the point where the sliding of the dam appeared
greatest. No indication is provided at to whether the opening
of the hole in the dam crest followed by water pouring through
the new opening lead to erosion at the toe in this region where
the stability of the dam appears to be worst.
After the movement of the dam in January 1910, dam engineer
Hatton was contacted and reviewed the situatuation. Hatton
felt the need to call on E. Wegmann, a consulting engineer
based in New York City to assess the situation. Wegmann
proposed adding a rockfill buttress on the downstream face to
increase the stability of the structure, as shown in Figure 11.
Hatton passed Wegmann’s recommendations onto Bayless,
but the recommendations were not adopted. The hole blased
in the dam crest was patched and within a month of the partial
failure, Bayless had the reservoir filled to within 2 ft of the
spillway. Even with a loss of about 600 gallons per minute of
seepage visual at the toe of the dam, there seemed to be no
further concern [Engineering News 1911]
.

Figure 12. Austin Dam afther the failure of September 30,
1911 (Courtesy of Potter County Historical Society).

Figure 13. Main St., Austin, PA, after the flood (Courtesy of
Potter County Historical Society).

Figure 11. E. Wegmann’s Feb. 14, 1910 proposal for
strengthening Dam [Engineering News 1911]
FINAL FAILURE ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1911
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Figure 14. Plan of Austin Dam after failure [McKibben 1912].
As the dam failed, it essentially broke apart into massive
pieces that slid downstream. Figure 14 shows a plan view of
the dam after the failure. As can be seen, the portion of the
dam east of the spillway where the initial movement in
January 1910 occurred, appears to have been where the dam
broke apart and the force of the escaping water moved the dam
greatest [Mckibben 1912].

California’s St. Francis dam in 1928 brought the uplift
discussion to the forefront in US dam design [Jackson 2003,
Harrison 1912]. This example of how new knowledge related
to design concepts may be slowly adopted and influenced by
engineering failures is a good example of the importance of
continual professional development for practicing engineers.
Hatton [1912] adds that he should have consulted an engineer
more experienced in dam design, especially as they relate to
dam foundations for this project.

ANALYSIS OF FAILURE
The failure of the dam has been discussed and analyzed to a
great extent. At the time of the failure, articles in Engineering
News [1911], the local and national newspapers, and
professional society publications [McKibben 1912] analyzed
and discussed the failure of Austin dam. The overwhelming
consensus was that the dam slid on its foundation. In some
discussions the concept that water seeping beneath the dam
softened the rock strata leading to sliding. Others proposed
the effect of uplift water pressure on the base of the dam was
the real contributor to the failure. The analyses and discussion
was a useful attempt to clarify the cause of the failure and
learn from this incident. Even Hatton [1912] provided his
opinion and essentially blamed himself for not considering
how the proposed reservoir full of water would affect the rock
strata below the dam he was designing. He states that his big
mistake was assuming the rock foundation would be
impervious.
Jackson [2003] considered the state of dam design at the time
of the Austin disaster. He notes that there had been prior
recognition of the role of uplift pressures on dam stability. By
the 1890’s European engineers were beginning to consider
uplift pressures in their designs in both England and France,
while in the United States, uplift was still not being
considered. The sliding failure of Austin Dam in 1911 and
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More recent papers have revisited the failure [USBR 1998,
Greene 1997, Greene and Christ 1998, Martt et al 2005].
USBR [1998] performed an analysis of the dam cross-section
for both sliding and overturning stability, as shown in Figure
15, indicating safety factors of 032 and 1.03, respectively.
Martt et al [2005] performed a more detailed analysis of the
failure. Their research included describing the regional
geology of the site, performing test pits adjacent to some of
the dam remnants and performing laboratory classification and
strength tests for the various rock strata present at the site.
They looked at shear strength and sliding between various
interfaces in the geologic strata. From the analysis of their
dam cross-section, shown in Figure 16, they determined that
the sliding failure of the dam occurred at the interface between
the sandstone layer immediately below the dam and the
underlying shale layer.
Delatte [2009] discusses some other aspects that likely
contributed to the failure. Addressing the issues of materials
and construction, he cites the use of cyclopean concrete in the
dam, the construction of the concrete during freezing
temperatures leading to contraction in the dam, and the
presence of cold joints in the dam as helping contribute to the
dam’s overall weakness.
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the human spirit resulting from the Austin Dam failure have
also been documented. Nuschke [1988], Largey [1997, 2011]
and Dixon [1912] present overviews of how the community,
region, state and nation responded to the tragedy. Figure 17
shows how tents provided necessary facilities, such as a
morgue. Other articles question the cause of the failure,
especially related to the greed of the owners in light of the
progressive movement in the early 20th century [Taylor 1911].
Rich [2006] has revisited the social responsibility aspects of
the failure. He took an expanded to look at the responsibility
of a number of various parties including the owner, the
engineer, the townspeople, the commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and professional societies of the time. It is
noted to by the Austin Dam Memorial Association that the
town of Austin provided an attractive incentive package to
Bayless to build his mill in Austin. The people of Austin and
their leaders were quite dependent on the Bayless mill for their
livelihood and were reluctant to show any concern for the dam
that brought economic life to the town.

AFTERMATH OF THE FAILURE

Figure 15. USBR [1998] Analysis of Austin Dam Stability.

Shortly after the failure, calls for state regulation of dams were
made [Scientific American 1911]. While some states had
already enacted regulations for dams, many were not
necessarily strict and often were applicable to publicly owned
dams and not those built and operated by industry. Within
Pennsylvania, legislation was enacted by 1913 to provide state
oversight for dams [Rich 2006].
Jackson [2003], Rich [2006], and Vesilind [2010] discusss the
ethical issues of the failure. While there is no record of Hatton
ever being reprimanded or found legally resoponsible for the
failure, Vesilind [2010] notes he would have been in today’s
professional societies.
He adds that Hatton’s career
blossomed after the Austin Dam failure. He was active in
professional environmental societies and served as chief
engineer for the Milwalkee, WS sanitary authority.

Figure 16. Cross-Section of Austin Dam used by Martt et al
[2005] for stability analyses.

RELIEF EFFORTS AND SOCIAL RESPONSABILITY
The relief efforts and stories of the suffering and triumph of
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Figure 17. Morgue housed in tent during the relief effort
(Courtesy of Potter County Historical Society).
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CONCLUSION
The failure of Austin Dam on September 30, 1911 provides an
interesting case history for undergraduate students of civil
engineering. The mistakes of the various parties involved are
easily understood. The analysis of the dam for both sliding
and overturning is easily incorporated and discussed by entry
level students and provides exposure to a number of technical
as well as non-technical issues that are an integral part of the
undergraduate curriculum.
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